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Justice William Brennan was famous for instructing his law clerks that the most important talent a member of the
Supreme Court could possess was the ability to "count to five."
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I.

INTRODUCTION
In Williams v. lllinois, 2 the Supreme Court held that a government expert's testimony

about a DNA report, absent cross-examination of the technician who prepared the report and a
showing that that particular technician was unavailable to testify, did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because the report was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted
and because the report itself was non-testimonial.

However, with five Justices expressly

rejecting the entirety of the plurality's analysis, no majority agreed on the reasoning underlying
the decision. The absence of a majority or a clear determination as to which, if any, of the
plurality's grounds is the "narrowest" has left lower courts with even less guidance as to what
constitutes "testimonial" evidence going forward. Both the plurality's and Justice Thomas's test
run afoul of earlier Confrontation Clause precedents and set the stage for Crawford v.
Washington to be overruled, in favor of the amorphous concept of reliability that the Court cast

aside almost a decade ago.
In Part II, this Note provides an overview of the major Confrontation Clause cases before
Williams, including Roberts v. Ohio, Crawford v. Washington, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,

and Bullcoming v. New Mexico. Part III details the various opinions set forth by the Court in

2

132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).

2

Williams v. Illinois. Part IV evaluates and predicts the future of the Confrontation Clause in light

of the fractured opinion in Williams v. Illinois.

II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AT ITS ROOTS: CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON AND ITS PROGENY
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with witnesses against him. 3 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as providing various guarantees to the criminal
defendant, most importantly, the right to vigorous cross-examination. 4 Although the Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence has further complicated the Confrontation Clause landscape, such
confusion is nothing new. 5 Ever since the Court's 1899 decision, Kirby v. United States, courts
have struggled to define the scope of this constitutional right. 6 Despite such ongoing confusion
and uncertainty, the Supreme Court did not make a major ruling implicating the Confrontation
Clause until Pointer v. Texasin 1965. 7
a. Ohio v. Roberts
It took another fifteen years for the Supreme Court to articulate any sort of substantive

framework as to how to evaluate the scope of the Sixth Amendment. In Ohio v. Roberts, the
Court held that the right to confrontation does not bar admission of an unavailable witness'

3

U.S. Const. amend. VI.
David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 115, 118 (2012).
5
Hon. G. Ross Anderson Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause Sanity: The Supreme Court (Finally) Retreats from
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in 60 THE FED. LAW. THE MAG. OF THE FED. BAR ASS'N, Mar. 2013, at 67, 68.
available at http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/march 13-entire.pdf.aspx?FT=.pdf.
6
174 U.S. 47, 56 (1899) (discussing whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant being tried for
receipt of stolen property has the right to confront evidence regarding the stolen status of that property: "This precise
question has never been before this court, and we are not away of any adjudged case which is in all respects like the
fresent one.").
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause applies to the
states).
4

3
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statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability." 8
This standard could be satisfied in either of two ways: first, any hearsay statement meeting a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception qualified as bearing an adequate indicia of reliability; second,
a statement that did not satisfy a firmly rooted exception could nevertheless be admitted if it bore
other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 9 Although a valiant first attempt, the
Roberts framework was quickly criticized as unclear and unstable, insufficiently protective of

defendants' rights, and contrary to the text and the history of the Confrontation Clause. 10
b. Crawford v. Washington

Twenty-five "murky, subjective, inconsistent, and unworkable" years later, the Supreme
Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and effected a drastic change in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington. 11 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in a 7-2
decision, took issue with the "malleable standard" of Roberts and found it inconsistent with the
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.

12

He stated, "[the Confrontation Clause]

commands not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross examination." 13 In rejecting Roberts, the Court
adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right and held "[t]estimonial
statements of witnesses absent from trial [can be] admitted only where the declarant 1s
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." 14

8

448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
!d. at 100.
10
Dylan 0. Keenan, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts, 122 YALE L. J. 782, 791 (20 12).
11
541 U.S. 36 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice
Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants? 94 GEO. L. J. 183, 189 (2005)
12
Crawford, 448 U.S. at 60.
13
Jd. at 61.
14
/d. at 59.
9
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Although the Court found the Confrontation Clause to bar only certain types of
"testimonial" statements, it "[left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial."' 15 The majority acknowledged that the absence of a concrete
definition of "testimonial" would create turmoil in the lower courts, but reasoned that any
"interim uncertainty" would not yield results any worse than those reached under Roberts. 16 The
Court did state that the Confrontation Clause applies to "witnesses," or those who "bear
testimony" against the accused. 17 It defined testimony as a "solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 18 The Court also articulated a "core
class" of testimonial statements, such as "ex parte in court testimony or its functional equivalent
... material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially." 19 The Court also included in this core class "extrajudicial statements
... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions" as well as "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial." 20
c. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts

The Court's first opportunity to refine the scope of Crawford and provide a more
concrete definition of "testimonial" came in 2009 in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.

21

In

Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was arrested and charged with distributing and trafficking in
15

!d. at 68.
!d. at 68 n. 10.
17
!d. at 51.
18
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
19 !d.
20
!d. at 51-52.
21
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
16
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cocaine. 22 At trial, the prosecution introduced bags of a white powdery substance that had been
found in the defendant's possession. 23 Three "certificates of analysis" were also admitted from
the state forensic laboratory that reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the bags
had been "[e]xamined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine."
24

As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn before a notary public and

submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted. 25 The defendant's counsel objected,
claiming Crawford required the analysts to testify in person. 26 The trial court disagreed, and the
certificates were admitted as prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight
of the narcotic analyzed, and petitioner was convicted. 27 On appeal, the Supreme Court was left
to decide whether the "certificates of analysis" were testimonial, rendering the affiants
"witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. 28
Applying the Crawford test, the Court held that the admission of the certificates violated
the Confrontation Clause because they were created for the "sole purpose of providing evidence
against the defendant" and were, "quite plainly, affidavits." 29 The court found the certificates
tantamount to live, in-court testimony because they did precisely what the analyst would do on
direct examination: testify that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his
co-defendants was cocaine. 30 Accordingly, the Court held that the certificates were testimonial
statements and could not be introduced into evidence unless their authors were subject to the

22

ld. at 308.
Jd.
24 ld.
25 Jd.
26
Jd. at 309.
27
Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009).
28
I d. at 307.
29
I d. at 311; id. at 330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
30
I d. at 3 10-11.
23
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"crucible of cross-examination." 31

Because there was no evidence that the analysts were

unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them,
the Court held that Melendez-Diaz was entitled to confront them at trial. 32 In requiring
confrontation, Melendez-Diaz refused to create a "forensic evidence" exception to Crawford,
holding that a forensic laboratory report, created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, ranked as testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.33
d. Bullcoming v. New Mexico

Just two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico was once
again asked to refine the scope of the Confrontation Clause, this time with respect to surrogate
testimony. 34 The main issue in Bullcoming was whether in-court testimony of an analyst who
did not sign, perform, nor observe the test was sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 35
At defendant's trial for driving while intoxicated, the court admitted into evidence a forensic
report certifying that the defendant's blood-alcohol concentration was well above the threshold
for an aggravated DWI. 36 The report also certified that the testing analyst had received the
sealed blood sample intact and followed the prescribed laboratory procedures when testing the
sample. 37 Instead of calling Curtis Caylor, the analyst who completed, signed, and certified the
report to testify, the prosecution called another analyst, Gerasimos Razatos, in his place. 38
Although Razatos was familiar with the lab's general testing devices and procedures, he had
neither participated in nor observed the test on defendant's blood sample, making him Caylor's

31

I d. at 317 quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
Id. at 311.
33
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2713-14 (2011).
34
131 S. Ct. 2705 (20 11 ).
35
Id. at 2710.
36
Id. at 2711-12.
37
ld. at2710.
38
I d. at 2712.
32
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surrogate. 39 Defendant's counsel objected on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the trial court
overruled the objection and permitted Razatos to testify. 40 Although acknowledging that the
report at issue qualified as testimonial under Melendez-Diaz, the trial court nonetheless held that
its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the Caylor was a mere scrivener
and Razatos qualified as an expert witness with respect to the lab procedures and testing
machine. 41
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's conviction and held that the
Confrontation Clause did not permit the introduction of a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial through the in-court
testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification nor personally perform or observe the
test reported. 42 As with the narcotics report at issue in Melendez-Diaz, the Court found that the
blood-alcohol report fell squarely within the core class of testimonial statements enunciated in
Crawford. 43 Although not notarized, the Court found the report sufficiently formal to qualify as

testimonial. 44 With respect to the surrogate testimony, the Court declined to accept Razatos's
testimony despite the fact that he was a knowledgeable representative of the laboratory who
could explain the lab's processes and details of the report. 45 The Court emphasized that
surrogate testimony is insufficient under the Confrontation Clause because it cannot convey what
the certifying analyst knew or observed about the test and testing procedures, or expose any
lapses or lies in the report. 46 The Court stated simply, "[t]he accused's right is to be confronted

39

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2706 (2011).
/d. at 2712.
41 /d.
42
/d. at 2713.
43
/d. at 2717.
44ld.
45
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705,2710 (2011).
46
ld. at 2715.
40

8

with the analyst who made the certification." 47 Faithfully applying the Crawford test, the Court
held that the report could not be introduced at trial because the State never asserted that Caylor
was unavailable and defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine him.

48

While concurring in the plurality's result, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to
emphasize the fact that the forensic report had been admitted into evidence for the purpose of
proving the truth of the matter asserted. 49 Although she did not opine on the matter, Justice
Sotomayor stated that the Court would face a different question if it was asked to determine the
constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss another analyst's testimonial statements
if the testimonial statements themselves were not admitted as evidence.

50

This precise

hypothetical was presented to the court barely a year later in Williams v. Illinois.

III.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN FLUX: WILLIAMS V. ILLINOIS
On June 18, 2012, almost a decade after rejecting the indicia of reliability standard of

Ohio v. Roberts as too malleable to protect against "paradigmatic confrontation violations," the
Supreme Court took a major step towards its revival in Williams v. Illinois. 5 1 In Williams, the
defendant was accused of rape, and at the bench trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony
of Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the Illinois State Police Lab ("ISP"). 52 Lambatos
testified that she matched a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, to a
profile that the state police provided of Williams' blood. 53 She also testified that Cellmark was
an accredited crime lab and that records reflected that the vaginal swabs taken from the victim,

47

!d. at 2710.
Jd. at 2714.
49
Jd. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
50 ld.
51
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
52
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223.
53 ld.
48

9

L.J., were sent to Cellmark and returned. 54 Importantly, Lambatos did not make any statements
regarding how Cellmark handled or tested the sample nor did she vouch for the accuracy of
Cellmark's profile. 55 The defense moved to exclude Lambatos's testimony on Confrontation
Clause grounds insofar as it implicated events at Cellmark, but the trial court admitted the
evidence and found Williams guilty. 56 Both the Illinois Court of Appeals and the State Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that Lambatos' s testimony did not violate petitioner's confrontation
rights because the Cellmark report was not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. 57 On appeal, the Supreme Court held on two separate, independent bases that there was
no Confrontation Clause violation. 58
a. The Cellmark Report Was Not Offered for the Truth of the Matter Asserted

The first part of the Court's opinion focused on one of the hypotheticals set by Justice
Sotomayor in her concurrence in Bullcoming, regarding the constitutionality of allowing an
expert witness to discuss another expert's testimonial statements when the statements themselves
are not admitted as evidence. 59 Historically, the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause
does not bar the use of testimonial statements admitted for purposes other than establishing the

° For example, out-of-court statements referenced by an expert

truth of the matter asserted. 6

solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which his opinion rests are not offered
for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 61 Here, the Court
found that Lambatos testified to the truth of the following matters:

!d.
!d.
56 !d.
57 !d.
58
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
59
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
60
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)).
61
!d. at 2228.
54
55

10

Cellmark was an accredited lab, the ISP occasionally sent forensic
samples to Cellmark for DNA testing, according to shipment
manifests admitted into evidence, the ISP lab sent vaginal swabs
taken from the victim to Cellmark and later received those swabs
back from Cellmark, and finally, the Cellmark DNA profile
matched a profile produced by the ISP lab from a sample of
petitioner's blood. 62
Significantly, Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any other matter concerning Cellmark and
made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into evidence. 63 She
also did not vouch for the quality of the work performed by the diagnostic lab or testify
regarding anything that was done at the Cellmark lab. 64 While Justice Kagan took issue with
Lambatos's reference to petitioner's DNA profile, Justice Alito equated it as a mere premise of
the prosecutor's question which Lambatos assumed to be true when she gave her answer
indicating that there was a match between the two DNA profiles. 65 For these reasons, the
plurality concluded that the Cellmark report was not offered for its truth and therefore there was
no Confrontation Clause violation. 66
b. The Cellmark Report Was Non-Testimonial
More significant for Sixth Amendment jurisprudence

IS

the plurality's second

independent basis for concluding that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred; that the
Cellmark report, even if introduced for its truth, was non-testimonial. 67 Abandoning nearly a
decade of precedent, Justice Alito and the plurality reasoned that because the introduction of a
DNA report prepared by a modem, accredited laboratory bore little, if any, resemblance to the
historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate, there was no Sixth

62

/d. at 2235.
/d.
64 /d.
65 /d.
66
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2237 (2012).
67
/d. at 2242.
63
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Amendment violation. 68 The Court then stated that the only modem day practices prohibited by
the Confrontation Clause are those that (1) involve out-of-court statements having the primary
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct and (2) involve
formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 69

Although a similar primary purpose test had been utilized to determine whether a
statement was made for the primary purpose of providing evidence, the Court, prior to Williams,
had never suggested that the statement must also be meant to accuse a previously identified
individual to qualify as testimonial. 70 In fact, "[w]here this test comes from is anyone's guess,"
as it derives neither from the text nor the history of the Confrontation Clause and has no basis in
the Court's precedents. 71 Not a single post-Crawford case ever utilized or even hinted at this
type of "accusation test." 72 Even Justice Thomas rejected the plurality's primary-purpose test as
lacking grounding in any constitutional text, history, or logic. 73 He described this type of test as
"disconnected from history," "divorced from solemnity," and "unworkable in practice." 74
Nevertheless, the plurality concluded that the Cellmark report "plainly" was not prepared for the
primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual or creating evidence for trial, but to respond on
.

an ongoing emergency.

75

In finding that the Cellmark report's primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist
who was still at large, the Court misapplied and impermissibly expanded the ongoing emergency

68

Jd. at 2242.
ld. (emphasis added).
70
I d. at 2274 (Kagan J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313 (rejecting a related argument that
laboratory analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not accusatory witnesses)).
71
I d. at 2273.
72
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 (2012).
73
Id at 2262 (opinion concurring in the judgment).
74
!d. at 2261-62.
75
I d. at 2243-44.
69
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test set forth in Hammon v. Indiana. 76 The test, as originally articulated in Hammon holds
statements to be non-testimonial when they are given within minutes of an event by frantic
victims of criminal attacks because the statements are made to enable police to respond to an
ongoing emergency and not to create evidence for trial. 77 In contrast, in this case, Lambatos
herself testified that "all reports . . . were prepared for this criminal investigation . . . [a]nd with
the purpose of eventual litigation;" in other words, for the purpose of producing evidence, not
enabling emergency responders. 78 Significantly, it took over a year for the semen on L.J.'s
vaginal swabs to be tested and a report sent to the police. 79 Given this timeline, it strains
credulity to assert that the police and Cellmark were primarily concerned with the exigencies of
an ongoing emergency rather than producing evidence in the ordinary course. 80 To apply the
ongoing emergency doctrine in this case, where the swabs were not sent by police to Cellmark
until nine months after the rape and were not received for another four months would be to
stretch the ongoing emergency test beyond all recognition. 81 Despite the plurality's contention,
the Cellmark report is, in every conceivable respect, a statement meant to serve as evidence in a
potential criminal trial, and thus is testimonial under the Confrontation Clause.
The plurality also attempted to distinguish the Cellmark report from the reports at issue in

Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, stating that in the latter cases, the reports were the equivalent of
affidavits made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial and
prepared by technicians who knew their contents (an elevated blood-alcohol level and the
presence of an illegal drug) would be incriminating. 82 Here, the Court claimed that the Cellmark

76

547 U.S. 813 , 822 (2006).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
78 Jd.
79 Jd.
80
I d. at 2262-63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
81
!d. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
82
I d. at 2243 .

77

13

report could not possibly have been generated to prove the guilt of a particular individual since at
the time ISP sent the sample to Cellmark, petitioner was neither in custody nor under suspicion. 83
Instead, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report was to generate an objective profile of a
then-unknown suspect's DNA. 84 Viewed side-by-side with the Bullcoming report, however, the
Cellmark analysis has a comparable title; similarly describes the relevant samples; test
methodology and results; and includes the signatures of laboratory officials. 85 It also established
"some fact" in a criminal proceeding, the identity of L.J.' s attacker and detailed the results of
forensic testing on evidence gathered by police. 86 In all material respects, the Cellmark report is
identical to the ones at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 87
The plurality also emphasized that because no one at Cellmark could have possibly
known that the profile it produced would inculpate Williams, there was no prospect of
fabrication or an incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically sound and reliable
profile. 88 However, as stated by Justice Kagan in her dissent, the problem with laboratory
analyses has more to do with careless and incompetent work and less to do with personal
vendettas. 89 For example, a study conducted in 2009, merely three years before the Court's
decision in Williams, concluded that invalid forensic testimony contributed to convictions in
60% of the cases where exonerating evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal
convictions. 90 If one of the goals of cross-examination is to expose an analyst's lack of proper

83

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012).
Id. at 2251.
85
I d. at 2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86
I d. at 2266-67.
87
I d. at 2266.
88
/d. at 2244 citing Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157.
89
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 , 2274 (2012).
90
557 U.S. 305, 319 (citing Garret & Neufield, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95
VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (2009)).
84
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training or a deficiency in judgment, it makes not a "whit of difference" whether, at the time of
the laboratory test, the police already have identified a suspect. 91
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer also reasoned that the Cellmark report was nontestimonial because statements of that kind do not implicate the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause is directed: ex parte examinations against the accused. 92 In support of that
proposition, Justice Breyer stated that when a laboratory employee is removed from an
investigation, operating in the normal course of professional work, and has no way of knowing
whether the test results will help incriminate or exonerate a particular defendant, "the need for
cross-examination is considerably diminished." 93 However, the requirement that a statement be
inherently inculpatory is contrary to history as neither law nor practice limited ex parte
examinations to those witnesses who made inherently inculpatory statements.

94

This

requirement also makes little sense because a statement that is not facially inculpatory may
become highly probative of a defendant's guilt when considered with other evidence. 95
Justice Breyer also looked to the Cellmark report's inherent reliability when finding it
non-testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. He reasoned that because the Cellmark report
embodied technical and professional data prepared by analysts in a certified laboratory, it was
akin to the "regular entries" hearsay exception that presumptively falls outside the category of
testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause. 96 Further, because the employees were
operating behind a veil of ignorance that prevented them from knowing the identity of the
defendant, Justice Breyer found it unlikely that a particular researcher would have a defendant91

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
ld. at 2249 citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
93 ld.
94
ld. at 2263 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing 16th century Marian statutes and 17th and 18th century practice
manuals for magistrates).
95 ld.
96
Jd. at 2248-49 (opinion concurring).
92

15

------

related motive to behave dishonestly or misreport test results. 97 However, only one year before
Williams, the Court in Bullcoming treated as testimonial a forensic report prepared by a modem

accredited laboratory and held that it "fell within the core class of testimonial statements"
implicating the Confrontation Clause. 98 The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected a reliability
analysis when it overruled Ohio v. Roberts, stating that "dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is
obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes."99 Any analyst who writes a
report that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation even if they
possess "the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa." 100
Justice Thomas's concurrence, while rejecting the plurality's holding that the
introduction of the Cellmark report was not for the truth of the matter asserted, reasoned that the
report lacked the "formality and solemnity" to be considered testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. 101 Once again, the Court had rejected this exact argument in Bullcoming
and held that the report at was testimonial even though it was not sworn before a notary
public. 102 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas found an indicia of solemnity test to better comport with
the Confrontation Clause than the plurality's "accusatory" test because solemnity had historically
marked the practice that the Confrontation Clause was originally designed to eliminate: ex parte
examination of witnesses. 103

Under this rationale, the Confrontation Clause only reaches

97

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221,2248-49 (2012) (opinion concurring).
!d. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
99
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 .
100
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U .S. at 316 n. 6.
101
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255.
102
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (reasoning that "the absence of an oath is not dispositive in determining if a
statement is testimonial." )
103
Williams, 132 S. Ct at 2260 (opinion concurring in the judgment).
98

16

"formalized testimonial materials," such as depositions, affidavits, prior testimony, or statements
resulting from formalized dialogue, such as custodial interrogations. 104
Applying the indicia of solemnity test to Williams, Justice Thomas concluded that the
Cellmark report was not testimonial because it was not made by a "witness" or sufficiently
"solemn." 105 Unlike the reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Cellmark report
was not a sworn or certified declaration of fact or the product of any formalized dialogue
resembling custodial interrogation even though it was produced at the request of law
enforcement. 106 Although the report was signed by two "reviewers," they did not purport to have
performed the DNA testing or certify the accuracy of those who did. 107 Justice Thomas also
distinguished the Cellmark report from the forensic report at issue in Bullcoming because
although unsworn, the report included a "Certificate of Analyst" signed by the forensic analyst
who tested the defendant's blood sample. 108 In contrast, the Cellmark report, in substance,
certified nothing. 109 In her dissent, Justice Kagan rejected the indicia of solemnity test and found
only "(maybe) a nickel's worth of difference" between the reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming and the Cellmark report.

110

She stated, "Justice Thomas's approach grants

constitutional significance to minutia, in a way that can only undermine the Confrontation
Clause's protections." 111

Jd.
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Jd. at 2276 (opinion dissenting).
Ill Jd.
109

17

IV.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE COMES FULL CIRCLE: A RETURN TO
OHIO v. ROBERTS?
Almost a decade ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the Supreme Court's failure to

clearly articulate a definition of testimonial in Crawford v. Washington. He stated:
The Court grandly declares that "[w]e leave for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' ...
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands
of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific
kinds of "testimony" the Court lists, . . . is covered by the new rule.
They need them now, not months or years from now. Rules of
criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the
country and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner. 112
In the Supreme Court's third case in as many years, it once again failed to provide a concrete
definition of testimonial statements. Without of a clear standard to evaluate the reach of the
Confrontation Clause, the "mantle of uncertainty" that Chief Justice Rehnquist feared has been
cast over criminal trials post-Williams. 113 Although on its face Williams may seem like a limited
decision regarding expert testimony not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the heart of
the opinion is much more malignant. The Court not only failed to clarify the narrow issue before
it, but issued a fractured opinion that calls into serious question the entire Crawford line of cases.

a. The "Narrowest Grounds" of the 4-1-4 Holding
The decision in Williams reveals significant discord amongst the Justices and a badlysplintered Court regarding the future interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The decision
itself was a 4-1-4 split, with no single opinion garnering the support of a majority of the Court.
Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Breyer.

114

Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence to express his skepticism of the
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part).
!d. at 70.
114
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
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plurality and dissent's approaches in defining the outer scope of testimonial statements postCrawford, specifically in reference to crime-laboratory reports. 115 Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment only, and specifically rejected every aspect of the plurality's test. Instead, he found
the Cellmark report non-testimonial under his own, "indicia of solemnity" test. 116 Justice Kagan,
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor, dissented from the opinion
and found it an "open and shut case" under the Court's precedents. 117 Although the plurality
found Cellmark report to be non-testimonial, the five Justices who joined in the opinion agreed
on very little and left significant confusion in their wake. 118

No single opinion garnered the

support of a majority of the Court. The lack of either a majority opinion or a clear holding, in
addition to the internal flaws of the various opinions, deeply muddles Confrontation Clause
doctrine.

As it stands, Williams leaves the Confrontation Clause's application to forensic

evidence in question and opens the door for an even more complicated body of cases going
forward. 119
By their very essence, plurality opinions are problematic because they leave lower courts
guessing as to which opinion is binding precedent. 120 The Court in Marks v. United States 121
addressed this issue and stated:

115

Jd. at 2244-45.
I d. at 2255.
117
/d. at 2265.
118
/d. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
119
See, e.g., U.S. v. Turner, No. 08 3109,2013 WL 776802, at *6 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2013) ("We begin by noting that
the 4 1 4 division of the Justices in Williams ... makes it somewhat challenging to apply Williams to the facts of this
case. As the dissenting opinion in Williams observes, the divergent analyses and conclusions of the plurality and
dissent sow confusion as to precisely what limitations the Confrontation Clause may impose ... ")
116
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When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds. 122
Even with Marks in mind, discerning the "narrowest grounds" of the plurality and concurring
opinions in Williams seems to be challenging at best. Assuming the "not for the truth" rationale
could even qualify as the narrowest ground given that it was expressly rejected by five Justices,
its grounds are broader than the non-testimonial approach. 123 Indeed, in the few months since
Williams was decided, courts have consistently rejected the plurality's "not for truth" rationale as

invalid and not supported by a majority of the Court. 124 With respect to the second independent
basis for the decision, the plurality held that the Cellmark report was non-testimonial because it
was not accusatory, was produced when the perpetrator was at large and before the defendant
was under suspicion, and was not inherently incriminatory. 125 Justice Thomas, on the other
hand, held that the Cellmark report was non-testimonial because it lacked sufficient formality
and solemnity. 126 "Which of these is the narrower grounds? I have no idea." 127
Instead of having broader and narrower opinions, Williams may present a case where the
opinions are just different. 128 Courts have already begun to speculate that there simply may not

122

!d. at 193.
Jessica Smith, Confrontation Clause Update: Williams v. 111inois and What It Means for Forensic Reports,
ADMIN. OF JUST. BULL., UNIV. OFN. C. AT CHAPEL HILL SCH. OF GOV'T 1, 9 (September 2012)
http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1203.pdf.
124
See, e.g., State v. Manion, 295 P. 3d. 270, 280-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) ("After Williams, the question is
whether the lead opinion's first rationale-that testimonial statements admitted for a purpose other than for their truthis valid. For the reasons explained in Justice Kagan's opinion, we think not. That is because five Justices of the
Court disavowed that rationale."); State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 922 (W.Va. 2012) ("[W]e find Williams a
tenuous and highly distinguishable opinion which does not, with majority support, dispense with the issue of to what
extent a surrogate expert may 'rely' upon testimonial hearsay.")
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Smith, supra note 125.
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Kent Scheidegger, Making Sense a/Williams v. 111inois, CRIME AND CONSEQUENCES BLOG (June 18, 2012)
http://www .crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/20 12/06/making-sense-of-williams-v-ill.html.
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be a "narrowest ground" of Williams. 129 According to Justice Liu in his dissent in People v.
Lopez, "[as of Oct. 15, 2012] [n]o published lower court decision, state or federal, that has

examined Williams has identified a single standard or common denominator commanding the
support of a five-justice majority." 130 "When it is not possible to discover a single standard that
legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law of
the land because no one standard commands the support of a majority of the Supreme Court." 131
In that case, the only binding aspect of such a splintered decision is its specific result. 132
In State v. Kennedy, the Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated, "we construe Williams
with extreme caution and admonish lower courts to do likewise." 133 The lack of guidance in the
opinion leaves lower courts with incredible difficulty in deciding which parts of the opinions to
follow, leading to an even more problematic situation where courts look to the various arguments
made in each opinion, whether technically binding or merely dicta, for guidance. 134
b. Confusion in the Court System
Williams's principal fault is the failure to issue a majority opinion, leaving chaos at the

lower court level in the wake of its 4-1-4 decision. While five votes approve the admission of
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See, e.g., Kennedy, 229 S.E.2d at 916 ("[W]e need not determine what the 'narrowest grounds' obtaining
concurrence in Williams are, or whether there are any such grounds, for that matter."); People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d
469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) ("The United States Supreme Court's most recent decision in this area
produced no authoritative guidance beyond the result reached on the particular facts of that case.")
130
286 P.3d at 484.
131
U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp, 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
132 Id.
133
229 S.E.2d at 919.
134
Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REv. 266, 272-73 (2012); See, e.g., Lopez, 286 P.3d at 485 (Liu, J., dissenting)
("[I]t is a mistake to contend ... that we should resolve confrontation clause cases by determining what would gamer
the votes of the five justices who supported the outcome in Williams. That approach-cobbling together the
nonoverlapping rationales put forward by Justice Alito and Justice Thomas in Williams-does not identify a "single
standard" or "common denominator" on which five justices of the high court agree."); United States v. Pablo, No.
09-2091,2012 WL 3860016 at *8 (lOth Cir. Sept. 6, 2012) ("[W]e cannot say the district court plainly erred ... as it
is not plain that a majority of the Supreme Court would have found reversible error ... it appears that five Justices
would affirm the district court in this case, albeit with different Justices relying on different rationales as they did in
Williams ... ");
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the Cellmark report, not a single good explanation is given as to why. 135 The decision has left
scholars, practitioners, prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and crime labs shaking their
heads in dismay. "Yesterday's decision in Williams v. Illinois should have been simple. But not
with these justices." 136 "[W]hat a bloody mess!" 137 "With such confusion, can Williams v.
Illinois really be called a decision at all?" 138 "[G]uidance for future expert testimony remains

wanting."

139

"[L]eaves questions unanswered."

140

"[N]othing short of a jurisprudential

disaster ... " 141 "If one of the jobs of the United States Supreme Court is to give practitioners
guidance on what is allowable in the courtroom, the court has failed when it comes to the effect
of the Confrontation Clause." 142
In the short time since Williams has been decided, uncertainty about how to evaluate
testimonial statements has already surfaced in lower court opinions. 143 For example, in Hall v.
State, 144 the Texas Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether the trial court's admission of a

drug analysis report violated the Confrontation Clause. In its analysis, the appellate court had to
decide whether Melendez-Diaz/Bullcoming or Williams controlled. 145 The Hall court held that
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the case was analogous to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, partly because "the lab report [was]
prepared ... after appellant's arrest." 146

Although analogizing the case to Melendez-Diaz and

Bullcoming, the court appears to have adopted the "accusation" test set forth by the plurality in
Williams. 147

On the other hand, In Wisconsin v. Deadwiller, 148 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
discussed Williams at length and held that it controlled.

The court stated that is was not

necessary to give a reason for affirming the trial court's admittance of an analyst's testimony
regarding a DNA profile match based on a different laboratory's report because "the narrowest
holding agreed-to by the majority [in Williams] ... is that the Illinois DNA technician's reliance
on the outside laboratory's report did not violate [the] right to confrontation because the report
was not testimonial." 149 In the absence of a true majority opinion or clear holding, courts across
the country are left struggling with forensic evidence as it relates to the right of criminal
defendants to confront all the witnesses against them without any clear guidance from the
Supreme Court. 150

c. A Standard Going Forward

Amplifying the uncertainty surrounding the Confrontation Clause is the obvious
philosophical schism amongst members of the Court regarding how forensic reports should be
evaluated post- Williams. Indubitably, Williams is the coming to fruition of what had hereto been
the minority position, as expressed in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in the majority by the
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same rough grouping of Justices. 151 The four dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming now
make up the plurality, with Justice Thomas casting the crucial swing vote based on a test that he
alone espouses. While previously joining Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor in the
majority in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, Justice Thomas "switched sides" in Williams for
purposes of the outcome only, not the rationale. The Court could have avoided such a confusing
outcome if only a single additional Justice had either joined the plurality to write a majority
opinion overruling Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming or joined the dissent and strengthened and
clarified the requirements of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 152 Instead, the Supreme Court
displayed, in a relatively simple case, displayed virtually all the dysfunction the justices' most
vocal and powerful critics ever could realistically contemplate. 153 Although Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming are technically still good law, their once clear holdings now seem hazy in light of
Williams.
Post-Williams, lower courts can evaluate Confrontation Clause cases in many ways, most

of which are in tension with one another. 154 Courts could generally narrow the reach of the Sixth
Amendment by requiring a certain degree of formality for testimonial statements, as per Justice
Thomas's indicia of solemnity test or require testimonial statements to be targeted at a particular
individual, as per the plurality's "accusatory" test. A number of the Justices also seem open to
returning to the reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts. Most sensible for courts, however, would
be to continue to follow the precedents of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming by refusing to extend
the holding of Williams beyond its specific result. Given the array of possible doctrinal

151

Michael A. Sabino, & Anthony Michael Sabino, Confronting the "Crucible of Cross-Examination": Reconciling
the Supreme Court's Recent Edicts on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 65 BAYLOR L. REv. 255, 334
(20 13)
152
Leading Cases, supra note 136, at 276.
153
Cohen, supra note 13 8.
154
Keenan, supra note 12 at 809.

24

approaches left open by Williams, one can only surmise that the Supreme Court will soon weigh
in again. 155

1. Justice Thomas's Indicia of Solemnity Test
Going forward, an argument can be made that Justice Thomas's op1n1on controls
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence because the indicia of solemnity test is the narrowest
rationale set forth by the Court in Williams. 156 Unfortunately, this test is one that Justice Thomas
alone espouses. While relevant, the Supreme Court has never relied solely on a statement's
formality to invoke the Confrontation Clause, and this type of approach has been consistently
rejected by the Court as "implausible" and likely to make the right to confrontation "easily
erasable." 157 Not only is the indicia of solemnity test contrary to precedent, but it is also subject
to abuse and unworkable in practice.

The formality of a forensic report would have to be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis and it will be impossible to determine which documents were
genuinely prepared informally and thus fall outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause and
which were deliberately left void of certifications or seals to evade the Confrontation Clause.
Although Justice Thomas qualified the indicia of solemnity test by stating "the Confrontation
Clause reaches bad-faith attempts to evade the formalized process," states may still be able to
evade the Confrontation Clause with a wink and a nod, simply by making- in good faithforensic reports as informal as possible. 158
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http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-holdings-and-implications-of-williams-v-illinois/.
157
Lopez, 286 P.3d at 483 (Liu, J., dissenting); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n. 3 ("We fmd it implausible that a
provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit
perfectly OK."); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 ("As the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized," 'the absence of
[an] oath [i]s not dispositive' in determining if a statement is testimonial ... [r]eading the Clause in this
'implausible' manner, the Court noted, would make the right to confrontation easily erasable.")
158
Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2261.
156

25

Furthermore, Justice Thomas's test, if adopted, would create an unworkable distinction
between which characteristics of a report make it formal enough to fall within the Confrontation
Clause and which do not. For example, in Bullcoming, the Court found the forensic report at
issue to be identical to the one at issue in Melendez-Diaz, "in all material respects," even though
it was not sworn before a notary public. 159 In Williams, however, Justice Thomas refused to find
the Cellmark report testimonial because it was not labeled a "certificate." 160 The subjective
nature of a formality inquiry has already been exposed in the few lower court opinions that have
attempted to employ the indicia of solemnity test. In US. v. Turner, 161 for example, the court
deemed the report at issue to be the functional equivalent of the report in Bullcoming. 162 The
report was both official and signed, constituted a formal record of the results of the laboratory
tests that the analyst performed, and was clearly designed to memorialize the that result for
purposes of the pending legal proceedings against the defendant. 163 Nevertheless, the court held
that although the report was certified, "it was not certified in the sense that Justice Thomas
deemed relevant." 164 Because of the divided nature of the Williams decision and the difficulty in
applying it to the facts at hand, the court ultimately "[gave the defendant] the benefit of the
doubt" and found the report sufficiently testimonial to trigger the protection of the Confrontation
Clause. 165 If Justice Thomas's test controls Sixth Amendment jurisprudence going forward, the
opinion in Turner may simply be the first of many to reflect the muddled state of the
Confrontation Clause and the subjective nature of "solemnity."
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2. Primary Purpose of "Accusing a Targeted Individual" Test

The plurality's new "accusatory" test is arbitrary and equally as flawed as Justice
Thomas's indicia of solemnity test and serves only to further muddle Confrontation Clause
analysis. The primary purpose test as originally enunciated in Davis v. Washington, 166 finds
statements testimonial when "the circumstances objectively indicate ... that the primary purpose
... is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 167 In
Williams, the plurality distorts this test into one requiring testimonial statements to have the

"primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct." 168
The first problem with the plurality's "accusatory" test is the broad, overarching
exception it makes for "ongoing emergencies." Traditionally and appropriately, the ongoing
emergency test has been used to exclude statements made within minutes of a criminal attack by
frantic victims trying to aid the police in their investigation. 169 In Williams, however, the Court
stretched the ongoing emergency test beyond all recognition and created a dangerous precedent
going forward. Extending the ongoing emergency test to cases like Williams where a routine
forensic report was generated months after the initial attack opens the door for virtually any
forensic report to be considered non-testimonial as long as the suspect is not yet in custody.
"[L]et us not confuse 'emergencies' with accusations for Sixth Amendment purposes."' 170
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Furthermore, there is no practical or textual justification for limiting the Sixth
Amendment to statements made only after the accused's identity is known. 171 The very words of
the Confrontation Clause utterly fail to constrain the time on may become a witness. 172 True to
the text of the Confrontation Clause, the court in Crawford specifically held that a declarant may
become a witness before the accused is prosecuted. 173 As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to
believe that until the suspect is in custody, forensic testing is simply part of a heroic effort to get
a dangerous criminal off the streets, and only after the suspect is apprehended forensic testing is
generated in preparation for trial. Given the rationale behind the Sixth Amendment, the right to
cross-examination should be triggered regardless of whether the suspect has been identified at
the time the forensic report is prepared and the ongoing emergency exception limited to its
traditional application.
Imbedded in Justice Alita's primary purpose test are shades of the flaws fatal to the nowrejected formulation of Roberts. 174 To the extent that the Williams plurality justifies the
allo·wance of evidence without the absolute need for confrontation, it paves the way for a return
to the inadequacies of Roberts. 175

3. Ohio v. Roberts's Reliability Test

In the wake of Williams, the stars seem to be aligned for the overruling of Crawford v.
Washington and a return to the reliability standard of Ohio v. Roberts. While some scholars find

a return to the reliability analysis of Roberts unlikely, since Crawford a majority of the Justices
have joined opinions that suggest the importance of reliability (or, the dangers of unreliability) to
171
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proper Confrontation Clause analysis. 176 Members of the Court have even written separately to
suggest that they are open to reconsidering Sixth Amendment issues. 177 Some scholars have
even opined that not only does a coalition of justices exist that could overrule Crawford, but that
the Court's decision in Williams arguably does in fact overrule it. 178
Williams highlighted a desire to return to the reliability standard of Roberts.

The

plurality emphasized that "reliability is a salient characteristic of a statement that falls outside the
reach of the Confrontation Clause." 179 To downplay the need for confrontation when "reliable"
statements are at issue, Justice Alito reasoned that because no one at Cellmark could have
possibly known that the profile they produced would inculpate Williams, or anyone else for that
matter, there was no "prospect of fabrication" and no incentive to produce anything other than a
scientifically sounds and reliable profile. 180 Justice Breyer agreed, stating that because the
employees were operating behind a veil of ignorance, it was unlikely that a particular researcher
had a defendant-related motive to behave dishonestly or misrepresent a step in the analysis or
misreport test results. 181
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However, this argument is little more than an invitation to return to the overruled
decision in Roberts, which held that evidence with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause.

182

As stated by the Court in

Melendez-Diaz and reaffirmed in Bullcoming, the Constitutional right to the Sixth Amendment

may not be disregarded at the Court's convenience. 183 Almost a decade ago, the Supreme Court
in Crawford made it clear that it is not enough for testimonial statements to be reliable to fall
outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause. The Court stated:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions
of 'reliability.' Certainly none of the authorities discussed above
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common law
rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. 184
There is no reason to believe that a reliability inquiry will be any less "murky, subjective,
inconsistent, or unworkable" now than it was thirty years ago. 185 This test was deemed by
scholars as "devaluing the Confrontation Clause" and an "amorphous and mystifying evidentiary
doctrine" whose value was widely questioned. 186 Further, it was found to insufficiently protect
defendant's rights by abdicating the Supreme Court's responsibility for regulating the admission
of hearsay and instead relying on evidence law to control the content of the Confrontation
Clause. 187 Any return to a reliability mode of analysis must be avoided as it is antithetical to
Crawford's explicit ouster of Roberts and the latter's now discredited theorems. 188
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4. Primary Purpose of "Providing Evidence" Test
The most sensible doctrinal approach for lower courts to take post-Williams is Justice
Kagan's "evidentiary" primary purpose test. This test is most faithful the Supreme Court's
. .
. pnor
.
.
back to
authontatlve
pronouncements In
cases going

craw1,£ord. 189

In Crawford,

"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial" were deemed
within the "core class" of testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause was designed to
protect against.
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This definition was reaffirmed in both Davis and Melendez-Diaz.
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Similarly, in Bullcoming, the Court stated, "a document created solely for an 'evidentiary
purpose' ... made in aid of a police investigation ranks as testimonial." 192
While there may be alternative pathways to evaluating forensic evidence, the Constitution
recognizes only one - confrontation.

The Court does not have license to suspend the

Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available. 193 Just as the sky did not fall
in 2009 after the Supreme Court mandated confrontation in Melendez-Diaz, neither will rigid
adherence to the Crawford test going forward.

V.

CONCLUSION

Although it seems clear that Crawford and its progeny are endangered, what will replace
it is anyone's guess, as no proposed alternative has commanded the support of a majority of the
Court. In fact, with the Court evenly divided on this issue, the controlling vote on any cases
involving expert testimony belongs to Justice Thomas- who will decide the case based on a test
189
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that none of the other Justices agree with. 194 One can only hope that the Supreme Court will
weigh in on the Confrontation Clause again in the near future and provide a more coherent,
workable standard to evaluate testimonial evidence. Until that time, however, lower courts
should take Williams for what it is - a fractured 4-1-4 opinion that stands for little more than the
facts it was decided upon. "For now, the Crawford revolution- as some have called it- lives
on. But its foothold also appears to be somewhat more tenuous than before." 195
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